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Abstract
The neuroscience of ethics is allegedly having a double impact. First, it is transforming the view of human
morality through the discovery of the neurobiological underpinnings that influencemoral behavior. Second,
some neuroscientific findings are radically challenging traditional views on normative ethics. Both claims
have some truth but are also overstated. In this article, the author shows that they can be understood
together, although with different caveats, under the label of “neurofoundationalism.” Whereas the neuro-
scientific picture of human morality is undoubtedly valuable if we avoid neuroessentialistic portraits, the
empirical disruption of normative ethics seems less plausible. The neuroscience of morality, however, is
providing relevant evidence that any empirically informed ethical theory needs to critically consider.
Although neuroethics is not going to bridge the is–ought divide, it may establish certain facts that require
us to rethink the way we achieve our ethical aspirations.
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Introduction
The origins of Western moral philosophy have an indelible birthmark—know thyself. Following that
Delphic precept, Socrates established an intimate relationship between self-knowledge and the pursuit of
goodness.1 To behave well, you have to first knowwho you are. The discovery of the true self (i.e., the soul)
is the path to envisage what is right. Indeed, the Socratic “inner eye” is spiritualistic, mainly because it is the
way to perceive the genuine essences of “Justice” or “Kindness.” Socratic ethics leads to that innermost
quest to discover who we are in order to discern how we should act. There is an explanation for this view
that todaymay seem certainly strange. LikemostGreeks, Socrates endorsed a teleological understanding of
human nature.2 Human beings are “preprogrammed” organisms that have a natural purpose, an intrinsic
finality.We have, in other words, a kind of software that we need to decode if we want to function as best as
possible. The foundations of a morally good life are thus ingrained in our very nature.
More than two millennia later, ethics is now a discipline that has been predominantly disengaged from
that Socratic spiritualist vision. The last two centuries of progress in the life sciences have drawn a scientific
picture of the human species and its evolutionary origin. Moreover, empirical studies of human morality
are a growing trend that seeks to shed light on the biological and psychological basis of ourmoral conduct.3
Neuroscience is precisely one of the leading fields that is studying the very nature of morality.
The term neuroethics has a twofold meaning. Adina Roskies established a landmark distinction
between the ethics of neuroscience and the neuroscience of ethics.4 The former refers to the ethical
aspects involved in neuroscientific research practices or in using specific neurotechnologies. The latter
refers to the neuroscientific studies that are addressing the neuropsychological correlates that underlie
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human morality. In this article, I will focus on this second version of neuroethics as the neuroscience of
ethics.5 I will address two claims about a double disruptive impact that the neuroscience of morality is
allegedly provoking:
Claim 1: Neuroscience is radically transforming the view of human morality.
Claim 2: Neuroscience is radically challenging traditional views in normative ethics.
Neuroscience, on the one hand, is impacting our self-conception as moral beings. The knowledge
provided by neuroscience could become essential to self-understand and change (even by biomedical
means) our moral behavior. In its most radical stances, to Socrates’ surprise, it is raising a sort of
“neuroessentialism”—the view which claims that “our brains define who we are,” or what is the same, to
investigate the self we need to investigate the brain.6 On the other hand, we may ask whether
neuroscience is transforming ethics as a discipline itself. There is an ongoing philosophical debate about
the extent to which the results of neuroscientific research can radically alter long-standing views of
traditional ethical theories.7,8,9,10,11,12
My thesis is that both contentious claims, though different in character, are intertwined: both relate to
what I will label as neurofoundationalism. Neurofoundationalism is the view that neuroscience con-
tributes to the foundational understanding of human morality. According to this perspective, neuro-
science can significantly illuminate the underlying neural substrates of moral abilities and judgments
(baseline of Claim 1) and/or lead to infer particular consequences in the normative domain (baseline of
Claim 2).13 Not surprisingly, Tommaso Bruni et al. stated that “neuromoral theories” can lead both to a
descriptive grounding (raising scientific understanding of humanmorality) and to a normative grounding
(resulting in claims pertaining to the prescriptive realm).14 In this article, I will clarify the basis, the scope,
and the philosophical problems deriving from these two claims. In parallel, it will be shown that some
conceptions of neuroethics are not too far from the Socratic quest for self-knowledge.
The structure ofmy argument proceeds as follows. In Section “Gadfly in the Lab: TheNeuroscience of
Morality,” I will summarize some evidence of the neurobiological basis of moral conduct, and argue that
these descriptive claims are more valuable as long as they avoid the construction of a neuroessentialist
image of human morality. In Section “The Neuroscientific Challenge to Ethics,” I will address whether
those empirical findings may disrupt ethical views and what (if any) are its consequences in the
normative domain, and argue that the radical transformation of ethics, as a prescriptive discipline itself,
is not plausible. Finally, I will conclude that any empirically informed ethical theory should indeed
critically appraise the neuroscientific knowledge of human morality.
Gadfly in the Lab: The Neuroscience of Morality
Morality is a hallmark of humanity.15 Admittedly, moral capacities are not an exclusive characteristic of
our species.16 Human morality, however, has a neurobiological basis that distinguishes us from other
animals in various aspects—and makes us similar in others. In this section, I will briefly sketch a body of
evidence that supports the neurobiological basis of human morality, and concentrate on brain damage
cases, neuroimaging, neuromodulation, and evolutionary theory approaches.
First, brain lesion cases provide noteworthy evidence of the neural underpinnings of morality. The
study of specific brain injuries has advanced knowledge about the neuroanatomical correlates of moral
processes. The case of Phineas Gage is probably the most famous example of how traumatic damage in a
concrete brain region can considerably affect moral behavior. Phineas Gage was a railroad worker—and
a person of “temperate habits”—who survived an accidental explosion in which an iron struck his head,
breaking consequently the skull, passing through the anterior left lobe, and making its exit in the median
line “breaking up considerable portions of brain.”17 As a result of the accident, Phineas Gage suffered
irreversible damage in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex which impaired his social and moral behavior.
After recovery, he was impaired in relation to ordinary decisionmaking skills, emotional abilities,
anticipatory planning, and the willingness to respect sociomoral conventions, although he maintained
the basic cognitive capacities and social knowledge.18 Beyond this example, nontraumatic disorders—such























































































































as neurodegenerative diseases or frontotemporal dementia—can also damage specific brain regions
associated with different moral aptitudes.19,20
Second, neuroimaging provides scientific insight into the brain in action. A prominent neuroimaging
technology is functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which since the nineties has had a great
impact on public perception of neuroscience.21,22 This technique enables researchers to measure the
neural activity of—healthy or unhealthy—participants during a specific moral task.23 More specifically,
fMRI studies have been copious in investigating the neural substrates of moral judgment. When
confronting diverse moral dilemmas, research subjects exhibit different brain activity that shows, for
instance, if their response is predominantly emotional or predominantly cognitive.24 It helps, therefore,
to theorize which are the salient characteristics of each experimental/control condition that might
influence the corresponding neural correlate. Accordingly, the fMRI scanner can pave the way for
showing “the hidden tectonics of the moral mind.”25 Other important neuroimaging techniques are
computed tomography, electroencephalography, magnetic resonance imaging, magnetoencephalogra-
phy, or positron emission tomography.
Third, neurochemical modulation and brain stimulation techniques can alter moral judgment and
behavior. On the one hand, brain chemistry affects morality. Neuromodulators are brain chemicals that
modify synaptic function, excitability, and neuronal dynamics.26 There are widely used pharmaceuticals—
such as propranolol, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, or drugs that affect oxytocin—that modify
moral dispositions.27 On the other hand, brain stimulation techniques—such as transcranial direct current
stimulation, transcranial magnetic stimulation, and deep brain stimulation—can also modulate moral
behavior through altering judgment, decisionmaking, prosocial dispositions, or aggressiveness.28 Basically,
neurostimulation techniques apply electrodes (by invasive or noninvasive means) that boost specific
bioelectrical currents of the brain.29 Furthermore, neurochemical modulation and neurostimulation can
be used beyond treatment or prevention of diseases or health purposes, aiming to moral neuroenhance-
ment.30 Moral enhancement is a daunting but exciting philosophical and scientific debate.31,32 Moral
neuroenhancement consists, roughly, in adeliberate improvement ofmoral capacities andbehavior beyond
normal state by neurobiological and neurotechnological means.
Fourth, the building blocks of humanmorality have an evolutionary origin. It is broadly accepted that
some (hardwired or at least prewired) features of human moral psychology evolved in the Pleistocene:
they are an adaptation to the ancestral environment of hunter-gatherers in which human foragers live in
highly interdependent small communities.33,34,35 In that sense, our evolutionarily forged moral psy-
chology indicates an obvious mismatch between the lifestyle of our ancestors and the ethical challenges
of today’s societies.36 Furthermore, humans share similarities in somemoral dispositions (e.g., empathy)
with their great ape relatives37 and also with other species of their primate lineage.38,39 Of course, some
controversies remain an open debate, such as whether evolution could explain not only the innate
architecture of particular moral capacities in humans, but also the specific content of widespread
normative codes—as some nativist theories signal about the evolved foundations of morality.40,41
Those four strategies, if charitably interpreted, might constitute a valuable contribution to the
understanding of human moral nature. This neuroscientific picture is not, however, without implica-
tions. Through this “process of self-discovery,” as we start “to understand ourselves better—who we are,
and why we are the way we are—we will inevitably change ourselves in the process.”42 Moreover,
neuroscience implies “the construction of a metaphysical mirror that will allow us to see ourselves for
what we are and, perhaps, change our ways for the better.”43 After all, neuroethics is not too far off the
Socratic aspiration. In the words of Kushner and Giordano: “To paraphrase Socrates, to knowwhere one
is going, it is best to recognize both where one is, and from whence one has come.”44
Thus,Claim 1—neuroscience is radically transforming the view of humanmorality—seems plausible.
Yet, any neuroessentialistic depiction of human morality should be avoided. Neuroscience runs the risk
of committing a hasty reduction if it equates the foundations of the moral phenomena merely to the
brain. Although it “can be tempting to interpret neuroscience as the holy grail of self-knowledge so
precious to ethics,”45 the explanatory power of neurosciences is often limited. First, although ethical
























































































































“moral center” that can be located in only one place of the brain.47 Second, neural networks have a great
plasticity that is modulated by social circumstances—nature via nature—in which the institutional
environment influences the “neural ecology.”48 Third, the neuroimaging studies of hypothetical
dilemmas are not the bestmanner to study daily lifemorality, because thesemoral judgment experiments
have limited ecological validity.49,50 Fourth, culturally well-establishedmoral patterns such as inclusivity
show that humans can modify their evolved moral limitations, “even when doing so is not only fitness
enhancing but even fitness reducing.”51 A finer-grained portrayal of human morality, therefore, cannot
not rely only in the neuroscientific perspective.
The Neuroscientific Challenge to Ethics
The fact that human morality has a neurobiological basis has opened stimulating debates. Some authors
have interpreted neuroethics as a philosophical challenge;52,53 others have discussed whether neu-
roethics could constitute new ethics.54,55,56,57 What could establish such novelty is of course disputed.
Michael Gazzaniga, for instance, ventured to claim that neuroethics gives the opportunity to develop a
“brain-based ethics.”58 Conversely, Alasdair Macintyre pointed out that the study of the brain could
jeopardize the perspective of ethics itself.59,60 In this section, I will concisely address three purported
disruptive potential of neuroscience concerning normative ethics: conceptual amendments, debunking
moral judgments, and bridging the is–ought divide.
First, the neuroscientific turn can lead to some considerable conceptual disruptions—major trans-
formations in the way we conceive something. In relation to ethical theory, there are remarkable
examples of concepts that are being revised in the light of recent brain science evidence.61 For instance,
ancient philosophical disputes about free will have been reinvigorated through neuroscientific
research.62,63,64 Furthermore, the philosophical discussion of topics such as moral agency is increasingly
requiring the consideration of biological and psychological knowledge, when in the past the lack of
empirical information about it was not considered inadequate.65 Other (nonexhaustive list of) concepts
that are progressively being enriched by neuropsychological scrutiny include culpability, empathy,
intention, intuition, punishment, rationality, responsibility, or self-control. The resulting changes in
these concepts, in turn, may impact on other traditional ethical issues such as the omission/act
distinction or the doctrine of double effect.66
Second, a prominent line of neuroscientific research has approached the neuropsychological
underpinnings of moral judgments characteristically elicited by ethical theories like deontology
or utilitarianism. Joshua Greene et al., for instance, showed that archetypical deontological responses
to the footbridge version of the trolley dilemma were predominantly emotional.67 This apparently
contradicts the foundations of deontological theories such as Kant’s based on rationality.68 In fact, it
is now broadly agreed that intuitive emotional responses—whose relevance was diminished by
former cognitive developmental theories—play a protagonist role in moral judgment.69,70,71 In this
sense, the evidence provided by neuroimaging can be “informative” or “even revelatory” and,
moreover, can revive old disputes between rationalists and emotivists sharpening new argu-
ments.72,73 On the other hand, neurocognitive sciences have shown that morally irrelevant psycho-
logical factors can influence moral judgment which may raise doubt about its normative
reliability.74,75 Furthermore, personality traits also influence the responses to characteristically
utilitarian or deontological judgments.76,77,78
Third, we shall consider whether the neuroscience of morality is narrowing the is–ought abyss.
Neuroethics is shedding light on how value judgments are rooted in biology and is telling “what brains do
value.”79 It seems that, at least from a naturalistic framework in brain research, the kingdom of facts and
the kingdom of norms are not so independent from each other. However, à la Moore, the need for
avoiding the naturalistic fallacy—namely, inferring moral properties from any natural set of facts—is
commonly pointed out.80 But once that peril has been averted, we shall acknowledge the descriptive
masquerade of neuroethics. As Kathinka Evers et al. put forward:























































































































although the “neuroscience of ethics” is typically considered descriptive, it has long been prescrip-
tive: implicit assumptions about brain facts, their value, and their normative weight underlie the
claim that neuroscientific findings will lead us to revise particular metaphysical and ethical
notions.81
In my view, to admit the not purely descriptive function of the neuroscience of morality is not truly
problematic for ethics. The longstanding Humean admonition of the invalidity of inferring a normative
statement (i.e., an “ought”) from a purely descriptive one (i.e., a “fact”) is commonly evoked. Ironically,
the is–ought divide is becoming the ultimate self-defense trench for moral philosophers in the face of the
advance of the neuroscience of morality. Surely, from empirical findings of neuroscience on their own
any substantive normative conclusion can barely be inferred, unless these findings are convoyed with
other epistemic and moral premises.82 It has been said, therefore, that major neuroscientific findings
have little normative significance to ethics.83,84 For sure, this is not to say that they do not have any
normative significance at all. Thus, if from a neuroscientific finding by itself we cannot reach a normative
conclusion, the case that relevant neuroempirical evidence can dramatically challenge any substantial
ethical commitment seems fairly implausible. For an ethical theory to be completely discredited, not only
do we need to know how the de facto brain mechanisms of morality work, but above all, we need
normative ethical reasons for what we should do.
Consequently, Claim 2—the neuroscientific disruption of traditional ethical views—is mostly
ungrounded and should be dismissed. In short, the prescriptive nature of ethics will not be radically
challenged by the neuroscience of morality.
Concluding Remarks: Toward a Neuroempirically Informed Ethical Theory
Ethics should not ignore neuroscientific progress. Current knowledge about the cerebral basis of human
moral psychology is probably a small part of what we will come to know in the coming decades. But even
if scientific understanding about the brain basis of human morality increases considerably, the manner
ethical theories are developed does not need to dramatically change. In this article, I have addressed two
claims related towhat I have labeled as neurofoundationalism—the descriptive and normative grounding
of ethics from neuromoral theories. I shall recapitulate my conclusions regarding both claims. First,
although neuroscience is providing insightful evidence about the neural underpinnings of moral
behavior, it does not have to lead us to an essentialist depiction of humanmorality. Second, neuroscience
alone cannot radically change the foundations of traditional ethical theories.Whereas it is true thatmany
ethical concepts, the way we understand moral judgements, and the relationship between facts and
values may be affected by the development of neuroscience, the complete disruption of normative
positions in moral philosophy is highly doubtful.
That said, there are at least two lessons to be learned from the neuroscience of morality. On the one
hand, wemay not be able to directly infer values from facts, but facts canmake us rethink howwewant to
realize the values to which we aspire. A neuroempirically informed ethical theory could be thus more
realistic, avoiding overdemanding “moral saints,” without renouncing the ideals of the normative
domain. One valuable way in which neuroethics can contribute to the realization of normative goals
is by providing insight into the myriad of ethically irrelevant neuropsychological factors that condition
us in our daily moral lives. On the other hand, neuroscience does not compete against moral philosophy
in the understanding of human morality. The relationship can be mutually beneficial if there is an
attentive and thoughtful exchange regarding the contributions of both fields toward reformulating long-
standing questions and providing novel answers. After all, “neuroethics is in someways oldwine in a new
bottle.”85
Finally, the everlasting aspiration to self-knowledge is not only a birthmark of ethics, but it is also part
and parcel of neuroethical research. However, the partial view of “fMRI myopia”86 in neuroethics might
be as shortsighted as the essentialist Socratic inner eye. Neuroscience needs to be complemented with the
























































































































conceived as the Gadfly of our times that disseminates disturbing truths. Ethics should welcome and
critically scrutinize the neuroscience of morality.
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